Fair Criticism

Yesterday danny of danny's blog cabin commented with some very fair and rational criticisms of the President's planned troop surge. Rather than trying to reply to his five (very fair) criticisms of the plan in the comments section, I though I'd put it up front for all to see.

Before getting our feet wet, let me say a few things:

• elgreggo had some pretty nice analysis of the political fallout of this decision in yesterday's comment section. I recommend checking it out.
• I wish we could just pull out of Iraq and pretend it doesn't exist. I, like most Americans, am tired of the war, tired of hearing all the bad news, and tired of talking about it.
• I hate having to defend sending more troops there, but, sadly, it seems to be the best of our three ridiculously over-simplified options (a. pull out; b. stay as-is; c. troop surge).
• Are danny and I likely to change each other's minds? It is possible, but unlikely. Rather, I hope we can all see that there are very rational people on both sides who can have a discussion about complex issues without devolving into the typical political Freakshow style.

With that being said, here are danny's five points and my responses:

1. It was tried in August of this year and it didn't work. The neighborhoods taken by US troops were pacified for a time, but as soon as they left, the violence returned.
   
   
   • I concede this point in part. Something similar was tried in August, but that is not to say that THIS plan was tried. 43 heard this criticism and laid out the differences in his speech last night. One he didn't mention was that the August plan was a U.S. only venture. This one has some pretty serious commitments from the Iraqi government behind it (whether they fulfill those commitments is a big question mark). The problem back then, as danny mentioned, was that after a neighborhood was secured the U.S. forces would hang around a few days, then leave. The insurgents who were driven out simply returned a few days later. The goal of this plan is to ensure the "hold" part of the "sweep and hold" strategy. Whether or not this will work is a good question that will now be answered in time.
   
   
   
2. 20,000 is not enough. McCain says this and he also says that it should be for at least 18 months.
   
   
   • You might be right. Maybe we should send more if we really want to make it work. This number--a shade over 20k--is actually the very low end of McCain's estimate (3,500-5,000 per brigade, McCain wanted 5-6 brigades in Baghdad). That is somewhat beside the point--will 20,000 fail to do what 40,000 would do? Maybe. But does anyone really wish Bush would send even more than this?
   
   
   
3. There aren't 20,000 more troops to send in. We're already stretched thin with multiple and extended tours.
   
   
   • Conceded, again in part. We are stretched thin--very thin. Too thin for my comfort. But we are again at a risk-reward point. If, out of the three options (pull out, stay as-is, troop surge), the first two are destined to failure, but the third, no matter how painful, gives us a chance at success, it is my position that it is worth trying. If we pull out the Iraqi government will fall. If we stay as-is we eventually will be forced to pull out anyway (even if not for years, we can't win on the current pace). That leaves the troop surge as our best hope of the three. Does that mean stretching? Yes. Does it mean stretching even thinner than we should be stretching? Yes. Does that mean it's impossible to do? Not impossible, just very taxing.
   
   
   
4. My congressman, Ike Skelton, has been saying that it's way too late for this type of strategy.
   
   
   • I respect Ike Skelton very much. What is implied in his statement is that there was a time when a troop surge, in his opinion, would have been successful (or at least stood a good chance of being so). On this point I agree with him--we should have had more troops going in and not botched the demilitarization of the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard. Where I disagree with him is in his assertion that it is now "too" late. Is it late? Yes. Is the situation so far gone that this plan is destined to fail? I don't think any of us can say that with authority--not even Ike Skelton.
   
   
   
5. Abizaid and Casey, the (former) generals on the ground, oppose this plan. Bush has said all along that he'll listen to his generals when it comes to troop levels. Then when they oppose his new plan he kicks them to the curb. He'll say that they've failed and need to be replaced, which may be true, but if you want an example of choosing politics over statesmanship, look no further. This was a brilliant political maneuver. He passed the buck for all those months and now he's using them as a scapegoat for his failed policy. He'll reshuffle the chairs and start the cycle over again.
   
   
   • Agreed. Your analysis on this point is solid. The only caveat I would make is that it may have appeared a "brilliant maneuver", but the fact is his party got "thumped" in the election and his approval ratings are in the crapper. It may have been a brilliant strategy, but it failed. Your point here is a high quality one.

You may well read this dialogue and decide you agree with danny over me. If that is the case, I respect your opinion. There are no easy answers there, and intelligent people can disagree on the best course of action.